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Theory of Mind–Based Action in Children 
from the Autism Spectrum
Sander Begeer,1,2 Carolien Rieffe,3 Mark Meerum Terwogt,2 and Lex Stockmann1
In this study we investigated whether task interest facilitated the application of Theory of Mind
capacities in high-functioning children from the autism spectrum. Children were invited to carry
out two simple tasks. Sabotage of both tasks by a third party resulted in the experimenter
appearing to have a false belief. Whereas pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise spec-
ified (PDDNOS) children tended to correct the experimenter’s false belief in the rewarded task
condition, children with autism were not influenced by task condition. These results highlight
the role played by social and communicative factors in the application of Theory of Mind knowl-
edge in the former clinical group.
KEY WORDS: Autism; PDDNOS; high-functioning; Theory of Mind; action.
INTRODUCTION
Various studies have shown that high-functioning
children from the autism spectrum (ASD) are impaired
in their ability to understand representational mental
states. These children have difficulty understanding that
behavior is usually regulated by mental states, such as
beliefs (thoughts, expectations, etc.), desires (wishes,
preferences), and intentions and not by the objective
reality (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993;
Rieffe, Koops, & Meerum Terwogt, 1996; Rieffe,
Meerum Terwogt, Koops, & Hagenaar, 2000). This in-
sight, currently known as the Theory of Mind (ToM),
became known to a wide audience when it was applied
by Premack and Woodruff (1978) in their study with
chimpanzees. The developmental study of Theory of
Mind skills, in a sense, goes back to Piaget’s work on
children’s thinking and egocentrism (Carruthers and
Smith, 1996; Piaget, 1929). Problems in the human de-
velopment of ToM are often associated with the social
and communicative problems that characterize children
from the autism spectrum—also known as pervasive
development disorders (PDDs; Wing, 1988). However,
recent findings have shown that the application of ToM
knowledge can depend on environmental factors or task
variables (Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stockmann,
2000; Serra, Minderaa, van Geert, & Jackson, 1999). In
this study, we look at factors that can influence the ap-
plication of ToM by children from the autism spectrum
in a real-life situation.
ToM competence is often investigated by testing
children’s understanding of false belief. In false belief
tasks, participants are usually asked to predict the be-
havior of a story character, given information about the
false belief of this protagonist and knowledge about
the real state of affairs. To pass such tasks, children are
required to acknowledge that a person’s behavior is
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(2000) has shown that false belief performance in nor-
mally developing children is poor at predicting the ap-
plication of ToM in everyday situations, such as the
ability to create false beliefs in others and the ability
to deceive. To put it briefly, impaired ToM knowledge
may not be the only reason for failing a false belief
task; several task variables may be involved in the task
performance, and the ecological validity of the task is
unclear. In contrast, we can look at how false belief
performance of ASD children compares with ToM ca-
pacity as measured by other ToM tasks. ASD children
have also been shown to be impaired in their ToM
capacities as measured by deception tasks (Baron-
Cohen, 1992, Sodian & Frith, 1992). However, there is
other evidence that these children perform as well as
non-ASD children of the same age (Rieffe et al., 2000;
Serra et al., 1999). In sum, we suggest that ToM knowl-
edge can be present in ASD participants, but may not
be applied the same way as by non-ASD controls.
Thus, the question arises of whether there are fac-
tors that can encourage the application of ToM in ASD
children. Existing evidence to help us address this ques-
tion is sparse. However, there is some evidence that
certain variables—independent from the construct to
be measured—interfere with the performance of ASD
children on other cognitive tasks. Successful perfor-
mance on these tasks seems to increase with the regu-
lar reinforcement of any behavior regardless of its
nature, or the presentation of a well-known task in the
middle of the task in question (Dunlap, 1984; O’Dell,
Dunlap, & Koegel, 1983). Other factors that appear to
facilitate performance are active participation in the
task; for example, having the child decide which ma-
terials will be used, what activity will be done, or what
the content of the test will be (O’Dell & Koegel, 1981).
In short, factors that increase involvement in the task
seem to have a positive influence on the task perfor-
mance of ASD children.
To reiterate, the performance of ASD children on
standard false belief tasks may be partly influenced by
ToM independent variables such as linguistic skills,
concentration abilities (Siegel & Beattie, 1991), and
low task motivation (Koegel & Mentis, 1985). More-
over, the function of beliefs is usually not considered
in these tasks; beliefs are intended to be an exact rep-
resentation of reality (Searle, 1983), yet, in the case
of false belief tasks, children are asked to reason based
on beliefs that do not represent reality. This seems con-
tradictory, as false beliefs are generally immediately
corrected in daily life (Meerum Terwogt, Rieffe, Tuijn,
Harris, & Mant, 1999). Because task involvement has
determined by their beliefs about reality, even when
these beliefs are wrong, rather than by reality itself. A
well-known example of a false belief task concerns the
famous doll Maxi. The participant in this task sees Maxi
putting a candy bar into a green cupboard. Maxi then
leaves the kitchen. Afterward, in full view of the par-
ticipant, but in Maxi’s absence, Maxi’s mother moves
the candy bar to a white cupboard. Finally, Maxi returns
to retrieve his candy bar. On answering the question
of where Maxi will look for his candy bar, a majority
of 3 year olds respond that Maxi will look in the white
cupboard, the place where the candy bar actually is.
They predict Maxi’s behavior based on their knowledge
of reality. Most 4 year olds, however, take Maxi’s false
belief into account and correctly predict that Maxi will
look in the green cupboard, where he will find that his
candy is gone (Perner & Wimmer, 1983). In addition to
this, most 4 year olds are able to create false beliefs in
others (Peskin, 1992; Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner,
1991). In sum, most 4 year olds appreciate the basic
principles of Theory of Mind.
Children from the autism spectrum however, show
poor knowledge of ToM, even when they are older.
Predictions of a person’s behavior or emotion are gen-
erally based on knowledge about reality, ignoring the
(false) belief of the person in question. Moreover, these
findings cannot simply be attributed to poor verbal abil-
ities in ASD children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,
1985; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). The im-
paired capacities of children from the autism spectrum
on the traditional false belief task are usually explained
by referring to an impaired conceptual understanding.
These children are said to be mind-blind (Baron-Cohen,
1995), meaning that they are incapable of discerning
mental activities such as thinking, dreaming, and
hoping.
However, studies into ToM and autism often rely
on a very limited range of tasks, with false belief per-
formance usually taken as the sole indicator of ToM
competence (Hughes, Adlam, Happé, Jackson,
Taylor, & Caspi, 2000). However, the false belief task
may not be an entirely reliable indicator of a functional
ToM (Meerum Terwogt-Kouwenhoven & Meerum
Terwogt, 1993; Rieffe & Meerum Terwogt, 2000). Fail-
ing a standard false belief task does not necessarily in-
dicate the absence of mental-state understanding. Other
factors, such as poor linguistic competence or poor con-
centration abilities, can hinder performance on the task.
Thus, a child who fails the task could be wrongly
assessed as having poor ToM (Siegel & Beattie, 1991).
Interestingly, a recent study by Newton, Reddy, & Bull
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METHOD
Participants
22 children with a diagnosis within the autism
spectrum participated in this study. The classification
of these children was based on a diagnostic investiga-
tion, in which the children were observed by a psychi-
atrist (L.S.) during 3 months and classified according
to the DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, 1994). The ASD group consisted of 12 children
with PDDNOS (mean age, 9–7 years; range, 7–3 to
12–0 years; 10 boys and two girls) and 10 boys with
autism (mean age, 9–6 years; range, 6–8 to 11–4 years;
all boys). IQ scores of four children were unknown. All
other children had a verbal and performance IQ of >80,
based on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-
III (Wechsler, 1991). The difference between the mean
full-scale IQ of the ASD group (103.2, SD 7.55, n = 9)
and the PDDNOS group (93.1, SD 12.8, n = 11) was
nonsignificant. A control group of 27 children (mean
age, 9–9 years; range, 9–1 to 10–9 years; 22 boys and
five girls), matched for age, gender, and intelligence,
was recruited from primary schools around Amsterdam,
the Netherlands.
Material
The materials used for the two tasks consisted of
an elementary jigsaw puzzle, intended for 4 year olds,
and a cassette player with a tape in it. The reward given
for one of the tasks was a piece of candy, to be taken
from a glass jar, centrally positioned on the test table.
A video recorder was used to tape the reactions of the
children.
Procedure
Children were taken outside the classroom indi-
vidually by an experimenter and brought to a quiet
room for a session of approximately 20 minutes. In this
room, a confederate was introduced as a colleague who
was working there because of a lack of office space.
The confederate was not involved in the interaction
between the child and the experimenter. Subsequently,
the experimenter explained the two tasks to be exe-
cuted; a jigsaw puzzle had to be made, and a story had
to be told and tape-recorded. The participants were told
only one of these tasks would be rewarded with a piece
of candy; half the children were promised the candy for
a quick completion of the puzzle, the other half for
a positive effect on the performance of ASD children,
and there is evidence of a lack of ecological validity
in traditional false belief tasks, this study will consider
the role of task involvement in correcting real-life false
beliefs. Correcting a false belief will be more to likely
occur if someone’s personal gain is at stake. The role
played by this active engagement in the correction of
false beliefs is the object of this study, based on the
actions of participants in a direct interaction with
the experimenter. This real-life setting and the em-
phasis on behavior will provide us with an ecologi-
cally valid insight into the ability to apply ToM
knowledge in daily life. After all, in addition to
ToM understanding, the application of this under-
standing in daily life is of at least equal importance.
A similar design to Meerum Terwogt et al. (1998)
was chosen in which it was in the participant’s own
interest to spontaneously correct a false belief in the
experimenter.
In the absence of the experimenter, but in full view
of the child, a confederate of the experimenter removed
an essential piece of two elementary tasks to be carried
out by the child. On return, the experimenter, who ap-
peared ignorant of the sabotage, began to commence
the task. We measured how long it took the children to
correct the experimenter’s false belief. On the basis of
earlier ToM research, we expected that ASD children
would not intervene, or would intervene less often than
normally developing children, and would wait longer
before correcting the false belief of the experimenter
on his return. After all, these children possess less in-
trinsic motivation to perform such tasks than normally
developing children. By giving a reward for comple-
tion of one of the tasks, we expected to increase this
task involvement, and consequently make the partici-
pants more likely to react in the rewarded than in the
nonrewarded condition.
Within the autism spectrum, several subgroups can
be distinguished. The prevalence of children with
autism and pervasive developmental disorder not oth-
erwise specified (PDDNOS) is highest. PDDNOS chil-
dren show similar social problems as children with
autism, albeit in a milder form, as fewer of the DSM-IV
symptoms can be found in these participants. Accord-
ing to a rough calculation, the prevalence of PDDNOS
children in Holland is four to five times greater than
the prevalence of children with autism (Van der Gaag
& Verhulst, 1996). Nonetheless, the quantity of research
with PDDNOS children is substantially lower than the
studies on children with autism; another reason to in-
clude both clinical groups in this study.
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was going to start the experiment. This was also done
to ensure the participants knew that he did not know
anything about the items taken away by his confeder-
ate. Between each successive remark, the experimenter
waited for 2 seconds. When participants had given no
reaction after six prompts, the experimenter made an
explicit remark about the absence of the item from the
task at hand. If no response followed from the partici-
pant, we checked whether they knew the confederate
had taken away the items. In the case of a response dur-
ing the successive prompts, the remaining prompts were
dropped.
RESULTS
Before discussing the results it is important to note
that the children reacted more quickly in the second
task than in the first task. This was because the chil-
dren often mentioned the item missing from the second
task directly after mentioning the item missing from
the first task. This artifact had no influence on the re-
sults, as the reward was equally distributed over the
first and second task. The type of task (puzzle or story)
had no influence on the children’s reaction time.
Table II shows the mean number of prompts given
to the clinical and control groups before they mentioned
the missing items, by reward and nonreward conditions.
Notice that a low score shows a quick response to the
false belief of the experimenter. From this table, it can
be seen that the control group reacted more quickly than
the clinical group in both the reward and the nonreward
condition. In fact, more than half the control partici-
pants reacted as soon as the experimenter returned. A
plausible explanation for this finding seems to be that
control children are less socially inhibited, and
therefore react more spontaneously to the experi-
menter (whom they have only just met). The expected
telling a distinctly pronounced story. The candy was to
be taken from a glass jar, positioned centrally on the
test table, within sight of the participants. The sequence
of both type of task (puzzle/story) and reward
(candy/no candy) were varied following a Latin square
design (Cotton, 1993).
After giving the explanation to the participants, the
experimenter told them he was going to get a cup of
coffee and that they would start the experiment on his
return. Hereupon he left the room for a short time. In
the absence of the experimenter, but in full view of the
child, the confederate got up and removed one essen-
tial item from each task, announcing, as if thinking
aloud, that she was going to work somewhere else, and
needed a piece of the puzzle and the tape from the cas-
sette player. She then took the objects mentioned and
left the room. On his return, the experimenter made it
clear that he was unaware of the missing objects, be-
having as if he did not know the confederate had taken
two crucial items from the tasks. The experimenter
prompted the child he (falsely) believed could begin the
experiment, using cues—subtle hints (see Table I) that
made it increasingly clear to the participant that the
experimenter (falsely) believed he could begin the
task. For each task, we measured the mean number of
prompts taken for the child to correct the false belief
of the experimenter.
Scoring
The experimenter used a series of successive re-
marks (Table 1) to make it increasingly obvious that he
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Table I. Successive Remarks of Experimenter
Order Remark
1 Experimenter returns and takes a seat
Story task
2 “So, we’ll begin with the cassette player”
3 “Then I can see how clear you can tell the story”
4 “There, here’s the cassette player”
5 “Okay, you can start, then I will turn the cassette
player on”
6 (control) “Hey, there’s no tape, do you know how that 
happened?”
Puzzle task
2 “So, we will start with the puzzle”
3 “Then I can have a look at how quick you can
do it”
4 “There, here are the pieces of the puzzle”
5 “Okay, you can start, and I will start the stopwatch”
6 (control) “Hey, it seems like there are not as many pieces in
the puzzle anymore. Do you know how that
can be?”
Table II. Mean Amount of Remarks from the Experimenter,




Group No Reward Reward conditionsa
Control group 2.04 (1.72) 1.74 (1.63) 3.78 (2.98)
(n = 27)
Autism group 3.81 (2.30) 3.14 (2.38) 6.95 (3.86)
(n = 22)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
aF(1,45) = 10.58, p < .01.
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The speed with which the children intervene in
correcting the false belief of a communicative partner
has important implications for interpersonal interac-
tions and can indicate impaired or diminished ToM use.
However, a late intervention, that is, just before the
experimenter draws explicit attention to the missing
object, can still be an indication of ToM knowledge. It
therefore seems to be of equal importance to look at
whether ToM knowledge is applied at all by these par-
ticipants. In an additional analysis, we did not look at
the number of prompts taken but only looked at whether
or not the children intervened. The reactions of the par-
ticipants were divided into two categories: a ToM
category, consisting of children reacting before the
experimenter’s remark that the task was sabotaged
(prompt 6) and a category of reactions after this remark,
indicating no ToM knowledge.
Table III shows the results of this dichotomous
scoring and confirms the earlier findings; all but one
of the PDDNOS children responded in the reward con-
dition, whereas only half of them responded in the non-
reward condition. The children with autism performed
quite poorly and were unaffected by the reward,
whereas the control children performed well in both
conditions. A 3 (Group) × 2 (Reward) MANOVA
once again revealed a main effect for Group
[F(2,48) = 9.16, p < .001] and an interaction effect
for Group × Reward [F(2,48) = 6.38, p < .01]. In
sum, even without consideration of the speed at which
the experimenter’s false belief was corrected, the
PDDNOS group still appeared to respond significantly
more quickly in the reward condition compared with
the nonreward condition.
difference between the reward and the nonreward con-
dition was not observed in either group. A 2 (Group:
deviant or control) × 2 (Reward: yes or no) MANOVA
with repeated measures on reward revealed a main
effect for Group [F(1,45) = 10.58, p < .01]. How-
ever, a main effect of Reward was not observed
[F(1,45) = 2.62, p = .11], nor was Reward found to
interact with Group [F(1,45) = 0.41, p = .53].
Further examination of the results, subdividing the
clinical group into a group with PDDNOS and an group
with autism, revealed a marked difference between the
two subgroups. In the nonreward condition, both groups
reacted relatively late in comparison to the control
group (see Figure 1). In the reward condition the chil-
dren with autism showed the same pattern, only react-
ing between the fourth and fifth prompt of the
experimenter. The striking result came from the
PDDNOS children. It was found that the PDD chil-
dren’s performances improved when they were re-
warded compared with the nonrewarded condition, with
it taking them significantly fewer prompts to correct
the experimenter, performing at the same level as the
control group. A 3 (Group: control, PDDNOS, or
autism) × 2 (Reward) MANOVA, splitting up the
clinical group, revealed a main effect from Group
[F(2,46) = 8.40, p < .01], and the interaction effect
for Group × Reward also reached significance
[F(2,46) = 2.44, p < .05].
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Table III. Reaction Patterns Divided for Spontaneous ToM
Applications, as Function of Group (Autism, PDDNOS, and
Controls) and Condition (Spontaneous/
No Spontaneous ToM Application)
Group
Condition Autism PDDNOSa Controls
Nonrewarded Condition
Spontaneous 6 6 24
ToM application (60.0%) (50.0%) (88.9%)
No spontaneous 4 6 3
ToM application (40.0%) (50.0%) (11.1%)
Rewarded Condition
Spontaneous 3 11 25
ToM application (30.0%) (91.7%) (92.6%)
No spontaneous 7 1 2
ToM application (70.0%) (8.3%) (7.4%)
aF(2,48) = 9.16, p < .001.
Fig. 1. Mean amount of remarks by the experimenter as function of
Group (Controls, PDDNOS or autism) and Condition (Reward/No
Reward).
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indeed be “mind-blind” (Baron-Cohen, 1995), which
explains why these children did not perform better on
the reward task than the nonreward task. In this case,
we would not be dealing with one continuous dimen-
sion of autism underlying the whole autism spectrum,
thus enhancing the feasibility of different graduations of
the same disorder, but instead distinguish fundamentally
different groups. However, without an in-depth analy-
sis of this problem, it should be acknowledged that
age-adequate ToM applications have been shown in
participants with autism as well. Rieffe et al. (2000)
demonstrated three subgroups from the autism spec-
trum (autism, PDDNOS, and Multicomplex Develop-
ment Disorder) to be able to apply ToM-based
knowledge if asked to explain unusual emotional
reactions of others. Still, more research is needed to in-
vestigate the status of differences between participants
with PDDNOS or autism. Only then can it be decided
whether a more fundamental distinction between these
groups is justified or whether they should be consid-
ered as different manifestations of the same underlying
disorder.
When we considered the hypothesis that children
with autism have the same dormant ToM competence
as the PDDNOS participants, the question became why
these children did not apply their knowledge in either
condition. On the one hand, the candy might not have
been rewarding enough to raise the task motivation to
a sufficient level, or even be unsuitable as catalyst of
task motivation at all for these children. On the other
hand, the study required children to initiate communi-
cation with the experimenter. Difficulties with initiat-
ing communication may have resulted in the impaired
responding observed. After all, the children were con-
fronted with an unknown adult man, whose actions they
had to correct out of their own accord. The DSM-IV
highlights an impaired ability to initiate and maintain
communication as one of the characteristics distin-
guishing between a diagnosis as PDDNOS and autism
(Buitelaar et al., 1998).
The results of this study might also be interpreted
alternatively. Hypothetically, participants could give an
adequate response without calling on their ToM com-
petence, a false positive response. If that were the case,
only communicative factors such as spontaneity (with
“spontaneous” children intervening quicker than
“nonspontaneous” children) or impulsiveness would
be responsible for the differences in the responses of
the children in this study. It would not have been these
children’s intention to correct the experimenter’s false
belief, but only to point out that “something” had hap-
pened, “That woman took something!” Children would
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the spontaneous applica-
tion of ToM knowledge of children with autism and
PDDNOS in an everyday situation; correcting some-
one else’s false belief. These children, as expected,
were found to perform more poorly than normally de-
veloping children, matched for age, gender, and intel-
ligence, if they were not externally rewarded. About
half the children of the clinical group did not intervene
at all after the experimenter returned and waited for
the experimenter to find out for himself that items were
missing from the task. Children from the control group
showed a very different pattern; 90% of these children
informed the experimenter about the change in the sit-
uation that had occurred during his absence, and half
the children did this directly on his return. These dif-
ferences between groups from autism spectrum and nor-
mally developing populations were in agreement with
the diminished or impaired ToM capacities of partici-
pants from the autism spectrum (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Happé & Frith, 1996). The attempt to increase the task
interest of the children had the expected effect on
PDDNOS children only; their response rates were sim-
ilar to the control children in the rewarded condition.
Children with autism tended not to respond, indepen-
dent of the prospect of a reward. A time-independent
analysis of the results, merely focusing on whether the
children reacted at all, revealed the same pattern;
PDDNOS children made a significant shift in their per-
formance when they were rewarded, controls responded
well in both conditions, and children with autism did
not tend to respond in either reward condition.
The question was why the children with PDDNOS,
but not the children with autism, were appreciative of
the reward. We noted in the introduction that PDDNOS
children show fewer features of the DSM-IV criteria of
autism than children with autism, as a result of which,
this diagnosis can be referred to as a “milder” variant
of autism. Buitelaar, van der Gaag, Klin, & Volkmar
(1998) remarked that PDDNOS children are featured
by social handicaps that closely resemble those of
children with autism while showing significantly fewer
problems in their communication, activities, and inter-
ests. Furthermore, PDDNOS children were deficient in
ToM abilities, but to a lesser extent than children with
autism in a study by Sicotte & Stemberger (1999). One
of the explanations for this difference could be that
PDDNOS children possessed the competence for ToM
reasoning but did not use this knowledge as normally
developing children do because of their delay in social
interactions. Children with autism, however, could
484 Begeer, Rieffe, Terwogt, and Stockmann
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this ability. They could see, but did not know where
to look.
Recently, a new trend of “advanced” ToM tests has
emerged that pursue more subtle and ecologically valid
indications of ToM. In addition to laboratory studies
that laid emphasis on a more pragmatic understanding
of others’ intentions, these tests also focused on actual
ToM-related behavior. One approach was the use
of filmed interactions, for instance, of uncomfortable
social situations; high functioning autism spectrum dis-
order (HFASD) adults were found to answer questions
about affective mental states of characters less accu-
rately. Also, when footage was used of natural interac-
tions between people who were unaware of being
filmed, HFASD adults displayed less empathic accu-
racy than controls. The sensitivity of the latter test was
even more impressive as a replication of the Strange
Stories test (another “advanced ToM” test) failed to find
group differences in the same sample (Happé, 1994;
Jolliffe, & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-
Cohen, & Rutter, 2000; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, &
Pichal, 2001). Measures of ToM understanding have
also been linked to actual ToM-related behavior such
as conversational abilities, specific social behavior,
peer interactions, prosocial behavior, and everyday
social competence (Capps, Kehres, & Sigman, 1998;
Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Frith, Happé, & Siddons,
1994). However, others failed to find a relationship
between ToM understanding and ToM behavior, in
particular when controlling for linguistic competence
(Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, & Frith, 1994; Travis,
Sigman, & Ruskin, 2001).
The lack of group differences between HFASD
and matched controls in tasks designed to measure
ToM understanding administered under structured lab-
oratory conditions could provide a biased view of ToM
competence in HFASD participants for two reasons.
First, their ToM competence could be overestimated
because of the simplification of reality in these tasks.
One of the core problems of ASD children is a lack
in central coherence (Frith, 1989). They fail to filter
reality into digestible pieces and often focus too much
on irrelevant information. The coherent information
presented in structured laboratory tasks can guide par-
ticipants in certain directions and thus overcome the
problem of central coherence that is apparent in daily
life. Second, the idea has been offered that HFASD
arrive at ToM understanding through a reasoning
process in which normally developing children
achieve the same understanding in a more intuitive
way (Travis et al., 2001). The measures of ToM un-
derstanding often do not allow for a differentiation in
then have merely displayed joint attention, an ability
often said to be precursive, yet not characteristic of full-
grown ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1995). However, the fact
that children’s responses—directed at the returning
experimenter—were in all cases explicit remarks about
the missing items showed an intention to inform the ex-
perimenter about the altered situation. If the children
were merely commenting on the situation or trouble
shooting, without the acknowledgement that the ex-
perimenter was unaware of the problem, one would also
expect remarks that directly or indirectly indicated
shared knowledge; “But there is no tape, is there?” or
“But the tape is still missing!” Nevertheless, this kind
of remark was completely absent.
Moreover, even if the time to respond was not con-
sidered in the analysis, and we only looked at whether
or not ToM knowledge was applied, participants showed
the same response pattern as the earlier analysis that
included the time aspect. That is, just like the controls,
nearly all rewarded PDDNOS participants intervened
eventually, whereas only half the nonrewarded PDDNOS
participants intervened, resembling the reaction of the
children with autism. Given the fact that the pattern re-
mained, independent of the time taken to respond, it
seemed irrational to explain the results based on com-
municative spontaneity alone. Where this factor may
have played a role, it could not account for the improved
responses of the PDDNOS children in the rewarded
condition without having to rely on ToM knowledge. It
seemed more plausible, therefore, to explain the absence
of adequate responses of the nonrewarded PDDNOS
children as false negatives; these children did posses the
required ToM knowledge but were not able to apply this
knowledge the way normally developing children did;
only if a reward was given and the consequences of their
actions were obvious did the PDDNOS participants re-
spond, whereas normally developing children responded
without needing this catalyst.
In conclusion, the improved performance of the
PDDNOS group supported the hypothesis that the daily
application of ToM knowledge can be dependent on
external factors, in this case a reward. This showed us
that the application of ToM knowledge by PDDNOS
children may be different from normally developing
children, but cannot be explained based on a funda-
mental lack of knowledge, as suggested in the “mind-
blindness” hypothesis. The discussion about the
often-observed ToM problems in ASD children shifts
from the degree in which ToM knowledge has devel-
oped to the availability of dormant ToM knowledge.
PDDNOS participants seemed to have the ability for
ToM reasoning, but they did not automatically use
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Future studies of actual behavior could be helpful
here.
An important question is how ToM understanding
is related to ToM behavior. Travis et al. (2001)
suggested a relatively direct link in ASD participants
between intuitive, nonverbal forms of social under-
standing and social behavior. In contrast, they sug-
gested a weaker link between consciously accessible,
nonintuitive verbal social knowledge such as false be-
lief understanding, and social behavior. Nonintuitive
social knowledge may fail to support social interaction,
because it is slow and rigid compared with intuitive so-
cial knowledge (Bowler, 1992). The limited relation of
nonintuitive cognitive ToM understanding and actual
ToM behavior such as outlined by Travis et al. (2001)
showed an advantage of measures of more intuitive
ToM understanding. Moreover, this finding also made
a strong case for direct measures of actual ToM-related
behavior. This study has illuminated the variability of
ToM-related behavior. The finding that the application
of daily life mind-reading abilities in HFASD individ-
uals varied depending on the interest in the task at hand
indicated that the use of ToM understanding in real in-
teractions could be activated. This seems to be an
important issue in the discussion about the relation be-
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Future research needs to investigate other factors
that might stimulate the application of ToM knowledge
within the different subgroups of the autism spectrum.
This is a clear break with tradition, stemming from the
more than 750 studies in which false belief tasks were
used in the last 15 years (Hughes et al., 2000). The
focus in these studies is usually on the revelation of
“true” ToM knowledge of test participants, rather than
the application of this knowledge. Failing a false be-
lief task should not automatically lead to the conclu-
sion that ToM knowledge is not available or impaired,
rather, the communicative and social factors that play
a role in the expression of this competence should be
considered.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Riëtta Oberink and Barry Holwerda are thankfully
acknowledged for assisting in the data collection.
The first author was supported by grants from the
Paedologisch Instituut, Duivendrecht, and the Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam, Holland.
486 Begeer, Rieffe, Terwogt, and Stockmann
472604.qxd  9/18/03  9:36 AM  Page 486
Rieffe, C., Meerum Terwogt, M., Koops, W., & Hagenaar, J. (2000).
The desirability of beliefs: Preschoolers’ appreciation of fact
beliefs and subsequent emotions. Infant and Child Development,
9, 147–160.
Rieffe, C., Meerum Terwogt, M., & Stockmann, L. (2000). Under-
standing atypical emotions among children with autism. Jour-
nal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 30, 195–203.
Roeyers, H., Buysse, A., Ponnet, K., & Pichal, B. (2001). Advanc-
ing advanced mind-reading tests: Empathic accuracy in adults
with a pervasive developmental disorder. Journal of Child Psy-
chology and Psychiatry, 42, 271–278.
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Serra, M., Minderaa, R. B., van Geert, P. L. C., & Jackson, A. E.
(1999). Social-cognitive abilities in children with lesser vari-
ants of autism: Skill deficits or failure to apply skills? European
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 8, 301–311.
Sicotte, C. & Stemberger, R. M. T. (1999). Do children with
PDDNOS have a theory of mind? Journal of Autism and Devel-
opmental Disorders, 29, 225–233.
Siegel, M. & Beattie, K. (1991). Where to look for children’s un-
derstanding of false beliefs. Cognition, 38, 1–12.
Sodian, B. & Frith, U. (1992). Deception and sabotage in autistic,
retarded and normal children. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 33, 591–605.
Sodian, B., Taylor, C., Harris, P. L., & Perner, J. (1991). Early de-
ception and the child’s theory of mind: False trails and genuine
markers. Child Development, 62, 468–483.
Travis, L., Sigman, M., & Ruskin, E. (2001). Links between social
understanding and social behavior in verbally able children with
autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31,
119–130.
van der Gaag, R. J. & Verhulst, F. C. (1996). Aan autisme verwante
stoornissen: Een inleiding. Kind en Adolescent, 17, 57–61.
Wechsler, D. (1991). Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd
ed., San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corp.
Wing, L. (1988). The continuum of autistic characteristics. In E. Schopler
& G. M. Mesibov (Eds.), Diagnosis and assessment in autism.
Current issues in autism (pp. 91–110). New York: Plenum Press.
Theory of Mind–Based Action in Children from the Autism Spectrum 487
conversation partner. International Journal of Behavioral
Development, 23, 113–124.
Meerum Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, K. & Meerum Terwogt, M. (1993).
Het misleidingsparadigma in het onderzoek naar ‘the child’s
theory of mind.’ Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, 48,
136–140.
Newton, P., Reddy, V., & Bull, R. (2000). Children’s everyday de-
ception and performance on false-belief tasks. British Journal
of Developmental Psychology, 18, 297–317.
O’Dell, M. C., Dunlap, G., & Koegel, R. L. (1983). The inportance
of reinforcing verbal attempts during speech training with non-
verbal children. Paper presented at the American Psychological
Association Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA.
O’Dell, M. C. & Koegel, R. L. (1981). The differential effects of
two methods of promoting speech in non-verbal autistic
children. Paper presented at the 1981 Annual Convention of
the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association, Los
Angeles, CA.
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., & Leekam, S. R. (1989). Explo-
ration of the autistic child’s theory of mind: Knowledge, belief,
and communication. Child Development, 60, 689–700.
Perner, J. & Wimmer, H. (1983). “John thinks that Mary thinks
that. . .” Attribution of second order false beliefs by 5- to 10-year-
old children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39,
437–471.
Peskin, J. (1992). Ruse and representations: On children’s ability to
conceal information. Developmental Psychology, 28, 84–89.
Piaget, J. (1929). The child’s conception of the world. New York: Brace.
Premack, D. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a
theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 512–526.
Rieffe, C., Koops, W., & Meerum Terwogt, M. (1996). Vroegkinder-
lijk begrip van mentale processen: de “Child’s Theory of Mind.”
In J. D. Bosch, H.A. Bosma, D. N. Oudshoorn, J. Rispens, &A. Vyt
(Eds.), Jaarboek Ontwikkelingspsychologie, Orthopedagogiek en
Kinderpsychiatrie 2 (pp. 216–236). Houten: Bohn Stafleu Van
Loghum.
Rieffe, C. & Meerum Terwogt, M. (2000). Deaf children’s under-
standing of emotions: Desires take precedence. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 41, 601–608.
472604.qxd  9/18/03  9:36 AM  Page 487

